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Preface
The work described in this report is a part of an ongoing
IIASA research effort on Integrated Management of Energy/Environ-
ment Systems. The primary goal of that effort is to develop the
methods and means by which we embed energy systems within regional
environments. The outputs of the program include concepts,
applied methodologies, and the evaluation of case studies. During
1975 the case studies were emphasized; they focussed on three
greatly differing regions, namely the German Democratic Republic,
the Rhone-Alpes Region in southern France, and the state of
Wisconsin in the U.S.A. The IIASA research was conducted within
a network of collaborating institutions composed of the Institut
fur Energetik, Leipzig; the Institut Economique et Juridique de
l'Energie, Grenoble; and the University of Wisconsin, Madison.
This report by Ralph Keeney is concerned with one of the
most important components of the research--the development of
an appropriate framework for evaluating the tradeoffs associated
with alternative energy/environment strategies. The work is a
first step in linking a large energy/environment simulation model
(developed at the University of Wisconsin) with a formal methodol-
ogy for assessing preferences and values. The approach presented
in thls paper has been extended to the three-region study mentioned
above; this work will be described in a later report.
W.K. Foell
Leader, Ecology/Environment
Project
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Abstract
This report has two main purposes. The first is to indicate
the appropriateness of multiattribute utility theory for addres-
sing the tradeoff issues invariably present in selecting energy
policy. The second is to illustrate by an example how one puts
the theory into practice. Specifically, an eleven-attribute
utility function over attributes including deaths, 802 pollution,
radioactive waste, health effects, and electrical energy generated
is assessed. A dialogue indicating the procedure used, with com-
ments on why various questions were asked, is presented in detail.
The resulting utility function is being used to examine energy
policies differing in terms of main fuel (fossil or nuclear) and
degree of conservation.
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1. Introduction
The selection of an optimal energy policy, or even the
choice of the better policy between two alternatives, depends
very much on the preference structure of the decision making
body. For instance, the choice between generating 70% of the
electricity produced in a region using nuclear power and the
other 30% with fossil-fuel plants, or an alternative of genera-
ting the same total capacity from 70% fossil facilities and
30% nuclear, would, among other factors, depend heavily on one's
preferences for (i.e., willingness to accept) various levels
of sulfur-dioxide and particulate pollution compared to the
possible levels of radioactive release. As another example,
whether it is desirable to double the electricity production in
the next ten years would depend on the perceived advantages of
the additional electricity and the perceived disadvantages of
the additional pollution and other unwanted impacts. For both
of these prototypical problems, there is no objective solution.
No decision procedure, formal or informal, can get around the
fact that preferences are a critical aspect in such problems,
and that they are inherently subjective.
Most experiences to date in analyzing energy policy formal-
ize many technological and economic relationships in trying to
present an accurate picture of the "total impact" of the various
options. Thus, for instance, the decision unit will eventually
receive a report indicating the impact--sometimes probabilis-
tically specified--of alternative A in terms of various pollution
levels at different locations, the acres flooded because of dams,
the number of people who must be dislocated, the likelihoods of
minor and major disasters at plants, the forecasted impacts on
electricity rates, the overall effect on system reliability,
perhaps the estimated health impacts on the population, and so on.
Similar information is provided for the other alternatives. But
this is where it ends. The decision making group must then some-
how integrate all this information in their minds and come up
with an (optimal) policy. Selecting this policy is very diffi-
cult. Three major aspects creating this difficulty are
-2-
1. The large uncertainties about what the impact of any
alternative will eventually be, and the difficulty in
separating this from one's preferences concerning
"possible" consequences;
2. The multiple objective aspects of the problems and
the necessity to make value tradeoffs among various
levels of different indicators;
3. The large differences among the preference structures
of the ｾ ｮ ､ ｩ ｶ ｩ ､ ｵ ｡ ｬ members of the decision making unit
and the lack of systematic procedures to articulate
these differences and provide a mechanism for construc-
tive compromise.
In this paper, we suggest and try to support the contention
that multiattribute utility analysis can be a considerable help
in dealing with the three difficulties mentioned above. Our
vehicle for doing this involves describing in detail the assess-
ment of a multiattribute utility function over eleven measures
of effectiveness used to indicate the environmental impact of
alternate energy development scenarios in the State of Wisconsin.
The Wisconsin effort, directed by Professor Wes Foell, has speci-
fied possible consequences of several energy alternatives. To
date they have not attempted to quantify the preference structure
for the decision makers involved. This paper is a first step
in such an effort.
Section 2 summarizes aspects of the problem which concerns
us. Section 3 states the technical terms and the main theoret-
ical result to be used. This result says that subject to certain
assumptions, the utility function must have a particular form.
In Section 4, the assessment of Bill Buehring's utility function
is illustrated in detail. The discussion essentially presents
the dialogue between Buehring and myself the first time the
assessment was done. Section 5 gives some follow-up assessments
conducted a week later. In the interim, Buehring had assessed
Wes Foell's utility function over the same eleven measures
and had several discussions about preferences over these attri-
butes. In Section 6, we calculate Buehring's utility function.
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The final section suggests uses of the utility function for
addressing the three difficulties outlined earlier.
2. Impacts of Alternatives for Electrical Energy Production
in Wisconsin
Over the past several years, Buehring and Foell and others
(see Buehring and Foell [2], and Buehring, Foell, and Dennis
[3]) have tried to assess the impact of various alternatives
for producing electrical energy in Wisconsin from now until the
year 2000. Rather than go into any detail, let me briefly
mention aspects of their work relevant to our discussion here.
The primary policies that Buehring and Foell are examining
differ in terms of two main characteristics: the total elec-
trical power generated and the percentages generated from nuclear
and fossil sources.
At the beginning of their work, a set of desired energy
pOlicy objectives were generated. The process was essentially
creative. Alterations were made after discussions to arrive
at a reasonably comprehensive set of objectives. The next step
involved specifying attributes (i.e., measures of effectiveness)
to measure the degree to which these several objectives were
met. These attributes, indicated by X1 '.'.'X11 are listed in
Table 1. Also in the table, we list the unit used to measure
each attribute as well as the range for the possible impacts
of any of the alternatives. It was simple to check that in
fact, for all attributes except electricity generated, less
of an attribute was preferred to more. Hence for later pur-
poses, Table 1 lists best and worst levels rather than maximum
and minimum levels.
Buehring [1] has specified in great detail exactly what
impacts each attribute is meant to capture. Let us simply try
to clarify a few aspects here. Fatalities include deaths due
to working in the coal mines, transporting the fuel, nuclear
power plant disasters, and prolonged pollution, for example.
Permanently unusable land may result from radioactive waste
being stored at a location. Attribute X2 measures the impact
due to the loss of usable land, whereas Xa is meant to indicate
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Table 1. Attributes for Evaluating Energy Policy.
Level
Attribute Measure Worst Best
X1 = fatalities deaths 700 100
X2 = permanent land use acres 2000 0
X3 = temporary land use 10
3
acres 200 10
water evaporated 12 1 .5 0.5X4 = 10 gallons
X5 = 802 pollution 10
6 tons SO 5
X6 = particulate pollution 10
6 tons 10 0.2
X7 = thermal energy needed 10
12kwh (thermal) 6 3
Xs = radioactive waste metric tons
200 0
Xg = nuclear safeguards tons of pluto- 50 0
nium produced
X10 = chronic effects tons of
lead 2000 0
X11 = electricity generated
1012kwh (electric) 0.5 3
the implications (e.g., genetic impact) resulting from the waste
itself. Attributes X3 and X4 measure the land and water re-
sources not available because of electrical power generation.
Attributes Xs and X6 are intended to capture all the undesirable
effects of air pollution other than health impacts--measured
by x10--and deaths from acute 802 exposure, measured by X1 . The
attribute X7 indicates the thermal power needed to generate the
electrical power measured by x 11 . Together, these provide an
indication of the waste and efficiency of the system. In addi-
tion, X11 is a proxy indicator of the desirable impacts on quality
x ••• x X be
n
A specific
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of life due to more energy. Attribute Xg is used to indicate
the vulnerability of the system to theft of nuclear material.
The next and major part of Buehring and Foell's work was
to estimate the impact of the various alternatives being investi-
gated in terms of the eleven attributes of Table 1, by trying
to trace backwards from the generation of electrical power to
all the impacts produced on the way. This included obtaining,
transporting, using, and disposing of the fuel. After this was
done for each option, one was at the situation described in the
introduction. The question is, how does one aggregate all the
data in a responsible fashion to select a reasonable, if not
the best, policy? After a diversion to introduce the terminology,
we return to this in Section 4.
3. Terminology and Main Result
This section summarizes the technical terms and the theo-
retical result used in this paper. Let X = Xi x X2
h X · h .th t 'ba consequence space, were . lS tel a trl ute.
1
consequence will be designated by x or (x1 ,x2 , •.. ,xn ). We are
interested in assessing the utility function over X, denoted by
u(x1 ,x2 , ... ,xn ) or u(x), which is valid in the von Neumann -
Morgenstern sense. (See von Neumann and Morgenstern [7].) Such
a utility function has the important property that in choice
situations involving uncertainty, one should choose the option
leading to the highest expected utility. An implication of this
when there is no uncertainty is that u(x) = ｵＨｾＩ if and only if
x is indifferent to y. Hence, the preference structure and all
the tradeoffs among attributes are specified once u is known.
Let us define X.. to mean X1 x ••• x X. x X. x ••• x XlJ 1-1 1+1 j-1
x X. 1 x ••• x X and x .. to be a specific level of X... Simi-J + n lJ lJ
larly, the notation ｾ Ｎ is defined as X 1 x ••• x X. 1 x X" 1 x· ••1 1- 1+
x X , and X. is a level of x..
n 1 1
The main assumptions used in the paper concern the concepts
preferential independence and utility independence. We will say
{x.,x.} is preferentially independent of X.. if one's preference1 J ---- lJ
order for consequences (x.,x"x .. ), with X.. held fixed, does1 ] 1J lJ
not depend on the fixed amount x ... This is equivalent tolJ
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assuming that tradeoffs under certainty among various amounts
of X. and X. do not depend on X... The preferential indepen-
1 J 1J
dence assumption implies that the indifference curves over
X. x X. are the same regardless of the value of X...
1 J 1J
In a similar fashion, we say Xi is utility independent
of X. if one's preference order over lotteries on X., written
ｾ 1 1
(x.,x.), with X. held fixed does not depend on the fixed amount
111
Xi. This implies that the conditional ｵ ｴ ｩ ｬ ｾ ｴ ｹ function over Xi'
given X. is fixed at any value, will be a positive linear trans-
1
formation of the conditional utility function over X., given
1
X. is fixed at any other value.
1
The main result used in this paper is the following
THEOREM. Let X = X1 x X2 x ••• x Xn , n > 3. If for some X1
,
{X1 ,X j } is preferentially independent of X1j for all j f 1 and
X2 is utility independent of X2 , then either
or
n
u (x) = L
i=1
k.u. (x.)
111 if L k. = 11 ( 1 )
n
1 + ku(x) = 7f
i=1
[1 + kk.u. (x.)]
111 if L k. ":f 11 (2 )
where u and the u. are utility functions scaled from zero to
1
one, the k. are scaling constants with 0 < k. < 1, and k > -1
1 1
is a scaling constant.
Equation (1) is the additive utility function and (2) is
the multiplicative utility function. 110re detaiJ.s about these,
including suggestions for assessment, are found in Keeney [5].
4. The First Assessment of Buehring's utility Function
Assessing a utility function is a process in which you,
the assessor, ask the decision maker a series of questions
about his or her preferences. From the responses, you construct
his or her utility function. First one asks some questions to
determine the general shape of the utility function. Then one
asks more specific questions to quantify a specific utility
function. Finally, there should be consistency checks and
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modification. My experience has been that almost invariably
in multiattribute contexts, the decision maker will make some
modifications to his preferences as first articulated. This
should not be disturbing, as a major purpose of the assessment
is to force the decision maker to understand the implications
of his preferences in these very complex situations. Since
the problem is complicated, it is unlikely that one can imme-
diately articulate consistent preferences that correctly re-
present the individual's feelings.
The assessment process is dynamic. What you, the assessor,
do next depends on how the person whose preferences are being
assessed responds to the current question. It depends not
solely on the answer itself, but on other factors such as your
perception of the ease the decision maker had in responding,
on his understanding of the question, anc on the desirability
of going into more detail. At a point where you feel your
previous question was misunderstood, and hence wrongly answered,
you can ask a similar question to verify your intuition. If
there was a misunderstanding, questions should be repeated.
In spite of these dynamic aspects, one can more or less
follow a pattern in assessing utility functions. Once the
attributes are specified, the assessment process might be broken
into five parts:
1. Familiarization with the terminology of motivation
for the assessment,
2. Verification of independence assumptions concerning
preferences,
3. Assessment of the tradeoffs among attributes,
4. Assessment of the individual attribute utility func-
tions,
5. Checking for consistency and modification.
In the dialogue which follows, we essentially cover parts 2
through 5. Before this assessment, Buehring read several
sources to familiarize himself with the terminology and proce-
dures used in such assessments. When we met for the utility
-8-
function assessment, Buehring and 1 first went over the meanings
of all the attributes. Then we discussed the point of Vlew
that Buehring should take In the assessments; that is, whether
he should articulate his own preferences, or those he feels
the government has or should have, or what. Clearly, the
different perspectives would lead to different responses. We
concluded that for this assessment, the preferences should be
his. With this, we were ready.
4.1 Verification of Preferential Independence Assumptions
Keeney: So, let's begin. First we can examine the preference
structure by looking at some preferential independence
conditions. As a start, consider attribute x1 ' fatalities,
versus x2 ' the permanently unusable land. We will use
Figure 1 to help in questioning. Note that the range of
fatalities, 100 to 700, is plotted on the abscissa and
the range of land permanently unusable, 0 to 2000 acres,
is on the ordinate. So I guess the best point is (x 1 = 100,
x 2 = 0); is that right?
Buehring: Yes.
loU
l./)
:::>
ｾ -ｾ l./)
...J UJa:
t- (J
Z ｾ
UJ
-Z N
ｾ X
ｾ
a:
ｾ
2000
'000
c
A
E
D B
300 500 700
X, (DEATHS)
FATALITIES
ATTRIBUTES X3/ ... · .,X" FI XED AT
THEIR WORST LEVELS
Figure 1. Fatalities versus permanent land use:
other attributes at worst level.
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K: And for now, let us assume that all other attributes X3 ,
x4 , ... through X11 are at their worst levels as defined
in Table 1. Now suppose you are at the best point A
(Figure 1); would you rather lose 600 people and move to
point B or lose 2000 acres and go to C?
B: Lose the 2000 acres.
K: [That question seemed to be easy to answer since it came
quickly. Thus I lowered the fatalities greatly.]
Okay, would you rather lose 100 additional people (point D)
or the 2000 acres?
B: I'd still rather lose the acres.
K: Not that this number needs to be precise--you can certainly
change any numbers anywhere in the process--how many people
on a first guess would you be willing to give up to be
indifferent to these 2000 acres?
B: That's pretty tough--that's permanent commitment for land.
But, relative to fatalities, it just doesn't seem that
important to me.
K: How about 110 people (point E)?
B: It's probably in that neighborhood. It's very small. I'm
just trying to think whether it's bigger than 101 ..• 1 guess
it is bigger than 101. Maybe 105, how does that sound?
K: That's fine for now. One thing that comes to my mind is,
what is included in attribute X2? Is it concerned only
with the loss of use of the land and not with the psycho-
logical worry that an individual who lives near a radio-
active waste facility may feel, for example?
B: No, it isn't supposed to include that. The problem of
waste is captured by attribute Xs which includes both the
high-level and low-level waste.
K: Fine, let's proceed. We want to move over to Figure 2
now and ask essentially the same question with all the
other attributes, X3 through X11 ' at their best level.
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Which would you rather do, go from (x 1 = 100, x 2 = 0),
point AI, up to 700 on X1 (point B I ) or up to 2000 on X2
(point C I) ?
B: 2000.
K: And what if I made this 400 on x, (point D I ) or 2000 on
X2 ?
B: Still 2000.
300 SOO 700
X, (DEA"r HS)
FATALITIES
UJ
cJ)
ｾ
0_
Zen
<tUJ
...J a:
Ａｚｾ
UJ-ｚ ｾ
<t
ｾ
a:
ｾ
2000
1000
C'
0' B'
ATTRIBUTES XJI ..... ,X" FIXEO
THEIR BEST LEVELS
AT
Figure 2. Fatalities versus permanent land use:
other attributes at best level.
K: [The responses seemed easy so I jumped ahead.] Is there
any reason why the indifference point in this case should
be any different from that in Figure 1, that is the '05
for X,?
B: Itls essentially the same, I think.
K: This says one thing, that the consequences (x, = 105,
x 2 = 0) and (x 1 = 100, x 2 = 2000) must be on the same in-
difference curve for the two levels of the other attributes
specified. Of course, it says nothing about any of the
rest of the preference structure. But let me save the
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general questions until after we try another specific
case.
Let us look at the preference tradeoffs between X2 and
x3 ' temporarily unusable land. What is included in X3 ?
[Such questions are asked partly to help me understand
the attribute. Then I can use my understanding of the
situation as an indicator of whether we are communicating.
If some response seems odd to me, I can press the decision
maker for his reasoning. Sometimes one should also do
this when the response seems reasonable. The spirit is
to force serious consideration of the consequences and
reconciliation of the discrepancies. The other reason for
such questions is to get the decision maker to consider
all the factors in making tradeoffs.]
B: This includes temporary disruptions (e.g., surface mining)
of land that can be recovered. Another example is land
use at a power station. Usually a large area surrounds
a facility, which is called an exclusion area at a nuclear
plant and something else at a coal plant. In any case
more land is bought than is actually used.
K: One thing you'll note is that although these attributes
have a relatively clear meaning to you, since you have
developed them and worked with them, they are probably not
quite so clear to someone else. Thus, in interpreting your
results, not only here with the preferences but also with
the impacts, it would be nice to have a clear statement
of what is and what is not to be included in each attribute.
B: Right.
K: So, let's return to the tradeoffs between X2 and x 3 ' fixing
the other nine attributes at their worst levels. The
ranges are indicated here in Figure 3. For x 2 ' they are
the same as before, and for x3 ' the best is 10,000 and
the worst 200,000 acres. The best point is A, no land
permanently unusable and 10,000 acres of land temporarily
unusable. If you must move up to either 2000 permanent,
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point C, or 200,000 temporary, point B, which would you
do?
B: Let's see. I guess the 200,000 recoverable acres would
be preferred.
K: That means you'd rather have (x2 = 0, x 3 = 200,000) than
(x2 = 2000, x 3 = 10,000).
B: Yes.
B
200
ATTRIBUTES X, , X4, ..... , X" ARE
FIXED AT THEIR WORST LEVELS
'00
X3 (10 3 ACRES)
TE MPORARY LAND USE
A
0 .....Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ｴ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｔ ｾ
10
'500 0
POINTS B AN D 0
'000 ARE IN DIFFERENT
2000 C
UJ
'":::>
0
z 1Il
<{ UJ
..J a:
u
.... <{
Z
UJ N
Z X
<{
ｾ
a:
UJ
a..
Figure 3. Temporary versus permanent land use:
other attributes at worst level.
K: I might question that. If X2 is just supposed to measure
the land use as opposed to why the land is actually un-
usable, here is a ratio of 200 to 2 (land temporarily
unusable to land permanently unusable in the last question),
and you prefer to give up the temporary usage.
B: That's true. It's the problem of quantifying the perma-
nency.
K: Of course there is no right or wrong answer here.
B: Right, I understand that. I don't feel too much difference
-13-
between the two (points Band C in Figure 3), to be
perfectly honest. If you changed the question to go
to either 1000 permanent or 200,000 recoverable, I'd
switch and choose the 1000. [This means that (x 2 = 1000,
x 3 = 10,000) is preferred to (x2 = 0, x 3 = 200,000).J
K: Let's take those as two answers, and now choose x 2 = 1500.
You either lose 1500 permanently (point D) or 200,000
temporarily (point B). I am actually looking for some
level of X2 between 1000 and 2000 where you are indifferent.
B: 1500, that is about it, I think.
K: Now when you consider this tradeoff, did you think at all
about where the other attributes were fixed?
B: No, I didn't.
K: Well, I think we can speed up a bit now. Consider Figure 4
where attributes other than X2 and X3 are at their best
levels. Do you prefer point B' or C'?
B: Point B', I guess.
B'
ATTRIBUTES X, ,X 4, .. J X" ARE
FIXED AT THEIR BEST LEVELS
POINTS 8 I AND D'
ARE INDIFFERENT
A'0.....,:-------+---------.......-
'0 '00 200
X3 ( '0 3 ACRES)
TE MPORARY LAND USE
'500
'000
2000 C'wII)
::::>
o
z
ｾ -
-J II)
W
t- a:
Z U
W <{
Z -
<{ N
ｾ ><
a:
ｾ
Figure 4. Temporary versus permanent land use:
other attributes at best level.
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K: Would the indifference point be the same? That is, are
you indifferent to D' and B'?
B: Yes, I think so; it's the same. I don't feel any differ-
ence.
K: This is an indication that the indifference curve over X2
and X3 is the same regardless of where the other attri-
butes are. This is the preferential independence con-
dition. Do you think that as a general rule, the trade-
offs between X2 and X3 don't depend on the other attri-
butes?
B: Yes, that's true ... as long as the other attributes are
fixed.
K: This indicates that the pair {X2 'X3 } is preferentially
independent of the other attributes.
So let's go on. Which one of these first three attributes
is easiest for you to think about? I will then use that
to examine additional tradeoffs.
B: Oh, I see. Frankly, with X1 ' I feel the indifference
levels would be very low; I think one of the other two
would be better.
K: Then I'll take X3 ' and we'll examine the tradeoffs bet-
ween X3 and X4 • Let me begin with a naive question. Is
it better to have less water evaporated than more, always?
B: Indeed.
K: So the best consequence in Figure 5 is point A. Here we
have fixed all attributes but X3 and X4 at the worst
levels. Which would you prefer, point B or point c?
B: I would say the water loss is preferred; I'd rather lose
the additional trillion gallons than the 200,000 acres.
K: How about if you compare point B to point D where X3 is
at 100,000 acres? This is actually a change of 90,000
acres ... from 10,000 at point A.
-15-
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Figure 5: Water evaporated versus temporary land
use: other attributes at worst level.
B: A 100,000 acres versus a trillion gallons ... that's a lot
of water. I guess I'd go with the land loss. I'd rather
lose the land than a trillion gallons.
K: Since D is preferred to B which is preferred to C, there
must be a point between C and D where you are indifferent.
What I usually do then is halve the difference. I say
usually because, for instance, if you easily answered
that B was preferred to C, but had a hard time deciding
D was preferred to B, this would imply that the indiffer-
ence level was near 100,000. Well then, I might give you
170,000 to make the answer a little easier and help you
to converge. [Discussion like this is meant to take the
mystery out of the assessment process, to help develop
rapport and to give one a break now and then.]
B: I see, that's a good policy.
K: So, how about x 3 = 150,000 (i.e., point E) or the 1.5
trillion gallons?
-16-
B: I'd say that's about as closely as I could define it.
I'm indifferent.
K: Moving to Figure 6, if we change all the attributes other
than X3 and X4 to their best level, do you see any differ-
ence?
B: No, I don't.
J'
K'
HI
GI
ATTRIBUTES X1 J X2 J Xs J •••••• , ｾＬ FIXED AT
THEIR BEST LEVELSF'
INDIFFERENCE
PAIR1S0
125
100
200 +-=---------..--------1
AI
10 ｾＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭｦＭＭＭＭＭＭＭ］Ｂ B'
0.5 1.0 1.5
X4 (1012 GALLONS)
WATER EVAPORATED
Figure 6. Water evaporated versus temporary land
use: other attributes at best level.
K: Fine. Now let's back up to Figure 5 and consider point F
versus point G. [Strictly speaking, one should ask ques-
tions in different ranges of the {x 3 ,x4 } consequence space
to verify preferential independence conditions. Assumptions
that are reasonable for part of the {X 3 ,X4 } space cannot
necessarily be extrapolated to all the {X3 ,X4 } space. The
analyst's judgment must be used to decide exactly how much
can be implied by specific responses.]
B: Okay, I have a choice of 200,000 acres and one trillion
gallons versus 150,000 acres and 1.5 trillion gallons.
-17-
In this case ... I'm not sure if 1 1 m confused but I think
lid take F. Maybe I should sit down with my pencil and
think about this a little bit.
K: One way to look at this is as follows. You are at F. Are
you willing to give up further 0.5 trillion gallons, in
addition to the one trillion, in order to reduce land
temporarily unusable from 200,000 to 150,000 acres?
B: Would I go that way ... no, I don't think I would.
K: You'd stay at F.
B: I think I would.
K: How about if you could go from F to H?
B: Yes, I think I would do that.
K: And where might you be indifferent to F between G and H?
How about 125,000 acres?
B: Yes, that's about as close as I can come.
K: Then let's jump back to Figure 6 and consider F ' versus G I
with X3 at 75,000 acres. Which would you prefer?
B: I would prefer the 75,000 acres and the 1.5 trillion gallons.
K: And how about 140,000 acres?
B: That's very close again.
K: Do you see any reason why it should be different than before?
B: I don't see any differences.
[To try to promote independent thinking each time, the
order used to converge to indifference is varied. To see
this, compare the sequence G,H,J in Figure 5 to the sequence
G',H',J',K ' in Figure 6. With the given responses, we can
reasonably assume that {X3 'X4 } is preferentially independent
of the other attributes.]
K: So now let's try the tradeoffs between X3 and x 5 ' the sulfur
dioxide emission. My understanding is that the sulfur
dioxide is here for effects other than on health. Is that
correct?
-18-
B: Yes; both Xs and X6 are meant to include aspects other
than health effects. The health effects of chronic air
pollution are considered as part of attribute X10 . The
fatalities from acute S02 exposure are in X1 .
K: So what effects do you wish to pick up here?
B: Visual effects, damage to buildings, odors, more frequent
washing of clothes, damage to property, reducing land
values, crop damage, etc ... things like that.
K: Okay, consider the tradeoffs between X3 and Xs illustrated
in Figure 7. Note that one advantage of using the same
attribute in the tradeoffs is that you get used to thinking
in terms of that attribute. Suppose you are at the best
point A and must move to either B or C.
w
1/)_
::>If)
ow
z a:
«u
...J«
>M
a:O
«-a:;r
o
a.
ｾ
UJ
t-
200
100
10 A
5
ATTRIBUTES X"X2 , X4 , X6 ,..... , Xl' ARE
FIXED AT ANY ARBITRARY LEVEL
D B
40 60 eo
XS( 10 6TONS )
S02 POLLUTION
Figure 7. S02 pollution versus temporary
land use: other attributes at
arbitrary levels.
B: I would prefer to lose the 200,000 acres.
K: And what if we reduce Xs to 40 million tons? Do you prefer
point C or D?
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B: I think I would still prefer to go to the 200,000 acres
(point C) .
K: And if Xs is 20 (i.e., point E)?
B: I guess at 20, I'd take the sulfur dioxide to the 200,000
acres.
K: Where will this break?
B: Oh, 2S million tons of S02.
K: [If one has a hard time answering this last question, I'll
usually offer a specific level of XS . In the first case,
the decision maker must select an indifference level from
an entire range, and in the second case, he must only
decide on which side of the specific given level is indiffer-
ence. The second question is easier to answer.]
Is it reasonable to assume that your answer above does not
depend on where the levels of the other attributes are
fixed, since I didn't specify them and you didn't ask me?
As
in the
That's right. I really don't feel any difference.
long as they are held fixed, they are not involved
tradeoff between X3 and XS •
K: Let me push a bit farther, because I would personally find
it easier to argue against the assumption in this case than
in many others. In particular, let's look at the impact
due to knowing the particulate pollution level measured
by x6 . Suppose I fix the particulate pollution at its
worst level--10 million tons--and I again ask whether you
would be indifferent between C and F in Figure 7.
B:
B: But I am stuck with 10 million tons of particulate in both
cases?
K: Yes, you're stuck with the 10 million tons.
B: Then lid still be indifferent between C and F.
K: Now suppose you have just 0.2 million tons of particulate
in all cases, would your answer change?
B: No, I'd still be indifferent.
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K: Let me suggest a rationale that would imply that there
should be a difference, depending on whether particulate
pollution was low or high. Of course, remember that there
is no right or wrong. My rationale is that people would
view air pollution as a whole. If there is a lot of
particulate, a little increase in S02 may have serious
effects, whereas if particulate pollution were low, the
same increase in S02 would be relatively unimportant. In
such a case, one might for example give up more of usable
land to reduce S02 from 40 to 30 million tons if particu-
late pollution were high than if it were low. Such pref-
erences would violate the preferential independence con-
dition.
B: As a matter of fact, there have been some studies which
indicate that S02 and particulate together cause more
health effects than equivalent amounts do separately.
However, this is health effects, and these are excluded
from attributes Xs and X6 . In terms of damage costs, it's
the acid more than anything from the S02' whereas it is
the sooting from the particulate. There doesn't seem to
be much synergism in this context, so I would remain with
my previous responses.
K: Fine, then we can assume that {X3 ,XS } is preferentially
independent of the other attributes. I'm not sure that
I ought to belabor the point. Is there ...
B: I don't think so. If I considered each of these other
attributes compared to say land use, I don't see why the
tradeoffs would depend on the levels of the additional
attributes as long as they are held fixed.
K: Thus we will assume that each of the pairs {X 3 'Xi } for
i = 1,2,4 ... ,11 is preferentially independent of the
other nine attributes. This satisfies the preferential
independence conditions necessary to invoke either an
additive or a multiplicative utility function. [The formal
result is given in the theorem of Section 3. Strictly
speaking, we did not check to see whether {X 1 'X3 } was
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preferentially independent. However, since {x1 'X 2 } and
{X2 'X3 } were each P.I., it follows from a result of
Gorman [4] that {X 1 'x3 } is P.I.]
4.2 Verification of utility Independence Conditions
K: Now let's check the utility independence assumption.
We will begin by looking at your preferences for different
numbers of fatalities, indicated by attribute x1 ' with
all the other attributes fixed. Consider the lottery
illustrated in Figure 8. This lottery gives you a one-
half chance of 100 fatalities with all other attributes
at their best level, and a one-half chance of 700 fatali-
ties with all other attributes fixed at their best level.
The question is, would you prefer the lottery or an option
which gives you 600 fatalities for sure with all other
attributes at their best level?
ATTRIBUTES X2 ' I X" FI XED
AT TI-EIR BEST LEVELS
, =700
Figure 8. A lottery involving fatalities;
other attributes at best levels
(before assessing certainty
equivalent) .
B: I'd take the lottery.
K: Okay, how about if fatalities are 150, with other attri-
butes at the best level?
B: I'd take the 150.
K: How about 200?
B: I'd take the 200.
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K: 450?
B: That's pretty close. At 450, I'd take the lottery I guess.
K: 375? The average of the lottery as you know is 400.
B: It would take something slightly under 400 for me to
choose it. I'd take 375.
K: And what if it were 400 versus the lottery?
B: At 400 I'd take the lottery, but if it were slightly under
400, I'd be very tempted to take the sure consequence.
K: At 390?
B: Yes, I'd choose around 390 as an indifference point.
K: Now why is this slightly under 400 as opposed to right on?
B: Well, I feel that as long as the expected value is the same,
I'd prefer to accept the risk for the chance that it might
come out right. But if there is a little bonus in there,
I think it not worth the risk that 700 people may die.
K: with that reasoning, should you perhaps prefer 399 to the
lottery? That's a bonus of one expected life.
B: That's right. Maybe that's it. I'd be indifferent at 399.
For all practical purposes, I guess it could be 400.
[After this process, Figure 8 ends up as Figure 9].
..4&(T
..J..9'(f
399
rv
X'1 :: 100
x 1 :: 700
ATTRIBU TES X2 I ... 'IX" FIXED
AT THEIR BEST LEVELS
Figure 9. A lottery involving fatalities;
other attributes at best levels
(after assessing certainty equiva-
lent) .
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K: Going on, let's ask a similar set of questions concerning
levels of fatalities with all other attributes fixed at
the worst level. Refer to Figure 10, a lottery with a
one-half chance of 100 fatalities and a one-half chance
of 700 fatalities. Would you prefer the lottery or 600
fatalities, with all other attributes again fixed at
their worst levels?
x, =100
ATTRIBUTES X2, ..... , X" FI XED AT
THEIR WORST LEVELS
X, :1100
Figure 10. A lottery involving fatalities;
other attributes at worst levels.
B: I'd take the lottery.
K: How about ｴ ｾ ･ lottery versus 2S0?
B: I'd take 250.
K: How about 300?
B: I'd take 300.
K: SOO?
B: I'd take the lottery.
K: [All the previous four questions seemed easy to answer so
I asked a general question.]
And where would you be indifferent?
B: Essentially the same point, just a shade under 400.
K: The thing to note here is that it appears that your indiffer-
ence point does not depend on the levels of the other
attributes. The relative preferences that you attach to
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different levels of fatalities seem to be independent of
the other attributes as long as their levels are fixed. Is
this true in the general case?
B: That's right.
K: This implies that X1 is utility independent of the other
attributes. This assumption, together with the preferential
independence assumptions which we already verified, im-
plies that your utility function must be either additive
or multiplicative. [The conditions for the theorem in
Section 3 have been verified. These conditions also
imply that each attribute must be utility independent of
all the others.] But let's just try one more attribute as
a check. How about taking xS ' radioactive waste storage,
since we haven't said much about that. Let's fix all
attributes at their worst levels and examine the lottery
in Figure 11. Here you get either 200 or 0 metric tons,
each with a probability of one-half. Would you prefer the
lottery or 40 metric tons with all other attributes at
their worst amounts?
ｾ ｮ xS=200100-46'"N
--l16" 1/2 X S = 0
Figure 11. A lottery over radioactive waste
with certainty equivalent shown.
B: I'd take the 40.
K: How about 170 metric tons?
In this case I'd go right to the
Yes, 100 metric tons would by my
I'd take the lottery.
expected value of 100.
indifference point.
K: Does your answer to this depend on the other attributes?
B:
B: No.
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K: [I felt that plutonium produced might have some effect on
the previous response. Although Buehring's general
response implied that this was not so, a specific check to
see whether some aspect has been overlooked is sometimes
prudent. ]
For instance, suppose I told you that Xg was high--that
many tons of plutonium were produced. This could lead to
a high theft level of such material. If I told you theft
was high, would it change your 100 indifference level in
Figure 11?
B: No.
K: Fine. Now let's check Xa between 0 and 100 metric tons
produced. If you had a fifty-fifty lottery yielding 0 or
100 metric tons, again with other attributes at their worst
levels, where are you indifferent? [Figure 12 was used as
an illustration of the lottery.]
ｾ Ｏ Ｒ Xa =100SO "J 1/2 x6 =0
Figure 12. A lottery over radioactive waste
with certainty equivalent shown.
B: Right at 50.
K: Does this answer depend on the other attributes?
B: No.
K: To cover the range of XS ' are you always indifferent to the
choice between 150 and a lottery yielding 100 or 200 with
equal probabilities, as long as other attributes do not
vary?
B: Yes.
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K: And now the general question. For any such lottery questions
involving XS ' regardless of where the other attributes are
fixed, are you linear? Would you always be indifferent at
the expected value?
B: Yes. Of course there is one little complication. Since
both Xs and Xg are nuclear effects, if terrorist activity
related to plutonium theft were very high, I suppose there
would be some extra resentment of radioactive waste. Is
that okay?
K: I'll let you answer that. Suppose there is that high
resentment, what is your indifference point to the lottery
in Figure 11 yielding 0 or 200 metric tons of waste?
B: I'm not sure I feel this myself, but I could see how some-
one might say: "If a lot of plutonium blackmailing is
going on, I am going to feel worse about radioactive waste
storage. Therefore I'd demand something lower than 100 be-
fore I'd be indifferent."
K: I think you may be mixing up two things. Suppose you said
you were indifferent to SO metric tons and the lottery.
B: Okay.
K: Well, then I offer you gO versus the lottery, and you say
no, since there is so much resentment. Well, there would
be a lot more resentment to the 200 metric tons that
you're apparently willing to risk.
B: That's true.
K: From my viewpoint, let me try to state what I think is
your concern. Let's return to where you said you were
indifferent to 100 and the lottery in Figure 11 regardless
of where other attributes are fixed. Take the case where
there is no theft and no resentment. Then, sloppily speak-
ing, you might say that the jump from 0 to 100 isn't too
important; but then neither is the jump from 100 to 200 too
important. They are equally important, but neither one is
critical. However, if the theft is high and there is much
resentment, then the jump from 0 to 100 is very important
because of all the concern about waste; but the jump from
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100 to 200 is also very important. Again they are equally
important. What we are concerned with in finding your
indifference levels to the lottery of Figure 11 is whether
the jumps from 0 to 100 and 100 to 2GO are equally im-
portant given the other attributes, and not, for instance,
whether it is more important to go from 100 to 200 if theft
and resentment are high or low. The qualitative feeling
that ｹ ｯ ｵ Ｇ ｾ ･ giving to me is that you would be a lot more
concerned about high levels of radioactive waste storage
if there were theft than if there were no theft.
B: Yes.
K: This does not imply that your relative preferences for
various storage levels change depending on where theft
(as represented by production available) is fixed.
B: Yes, I agree.
ｉ ｾ Ｚ Now what such an attitude may do is affect your tradeoffs
between say X3 and XS ' given levels of Xg • (That is, it
may affect the preferential independence condition.) For
instance, if theft is high, you may be willing to give up
more usable land temporarily to reduce radioactive waste
from 100 to 50 metric tons, than you would be if theft
were low. This is the type of preferences indicated by
your comments. So it has to do with the evaluation of
radioactive waste versus other attributes asa function of
tons of plutonium produced, rather than with the relative
preferences for various levels of waste as a function of
plutonium produced.
B: I believe I was thinking of simultaneous changes in the
level of theft as I was changing radioactive storage levels.
I can see how the argument says that 100 should be my
indifference level for the fifty-fifty lottery of 0 or 200
metric tons of waste.
K: Okay, then we'll assume that Xs is utility independent of
the other attributes.
[Next we went back and explicitly checked whether Buehring
did feel that tradeoffs among X3 ' land temporarily unusable,
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and xS' radioactive waste, depended on the tons of pluto-
nium produced. It turned out that he did not. Hence we
continued to assume that {X 3 'xS } was preferentially indepen-
dent of the other attributes.]
4.3 Ordering the Scaling Constants
K: Now we come to the assessment part. The conditions we have
just verified imply that either the additive form or the
multiplicative form of the utility function discussed in Sec-
tion 3 must hold. To assess either of these, we need to get
the k. 's and the u. IS. From the theorem in Section 3, k
1 1
is calculated from the kits if the multiplicative form holds.
The tough part is probably assessing the k. IS.
1
As a first step, let's try to order the k. 'so To do this,
1
refer to Table 1 and assume that all attributes are at
their worst levels. To get the rankings, we need to know
the order in which you would push these attributes up from
their worst to their best levels if you had the choice.
First, if you could push just one of them from the worst
to the best level, which attribute would you choose? To
help you think about this, let me go through some of them
palrwise.
Take attributes X1 and x2 . Consider an option leading to
700 fatalities and 2000 acres of land permanently unus-
able; both attributes are at their worst level. Would you
rather move up to 100 fatalities or to 0 acres of land?
B: 100 fatalities.
K: This answer, which implies that k 1 is greater than k 2 ,
seemed clear from the beginning of our discussion. [Had
Buehring responded 0 acres, I would have pushed for the
reasoning.]
B: Right.
K: So now I'll take the better of these two and compare it
with temporary land unusable. Would you rather go from
700 to 100 fatalities or 200,000 to 10,000 acres of land?
B: Change the fatalities.
than k 3 .)
(This implies that k 1 is greater
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K: How about water evaporated, 1.5 to 0.5 trillion gallons,
or ...
B: Fatalities; the 600 additional fatalities are going to be
the most important I think.
K: Well, let's try radioactive waste: 200 to 0 metric tons
stored or 700 to 100 fatalities. Now presumably some of
the thoughts here concern possible genetic impacts of the
radioactive wastes.
B: Yes, that's true.
K: So is that worth the 600 people between now and the year
2000?
(Thus k 1 isNo, it isn't; the 600 is still worth more.
greater than k S .)
K: How about nuclear safeguards: is it better to go from
50 to 0 tons produced or from 700 to 100 fatalities?
B:
B: I'd still prefer to save the people.
K: And the lead produced measured by X10 ?
B: Chronic health effects--that's a mysterious one. That
could be worth more than 600 actually, but I don't think
it is. [An analysis of preferences often indicates ques-
tions like this which are important in determining policy,
but for which the decision maker needs more information.
Often such information is available. Once the question is
clearly articulated, one can begin to look for the answer.]
K: So you'd take the 600?
B: Yes.
K: And how about electricity generated, 0.5 to 3?
B: That's an interesting one; preferences go the other way.
K: I think the way to think about this involves what happens
to Wisconsin if only 0.5 trIllion kilowatt-hours are
produced.
B: It's hard for me to think about X11 ' electricity generated.
The level of U.5 trillion ｫ ｾ ｬ ｯ ｷ ｡ ｴ ｴ ｳ might not cause that
much suffering. [Then Buehring checked some electricity
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consumption table for Wisconsin.] At our current con-
sumption rate, we will use 0.9 trillion kilowatts between
now and 2000. That is a cut of almost half. But I think
I'd still make the choice of saving the 600 people.
K: Of course, some of this electricity may run kidney dialysis
machines, for example.
B: Yes, that's true; but I'm assuming that cuts would be
selective and such things as hospitals and schools would
stay in operation.
K: However, with a fifty percent cut in electricity, you would
certainly affect life style. But anyway, you choose the
600 fatalities to be the most important.
B: That's right.
K: This means the largest k i is k,. [A common error made in
many studies is to ask which of several attributes is most
important, independent of their ranges. If the range of
fatalities were changed from 700 to 690, changes from best
to worst on several other attributes would have been more
important than 700 to 690 fatalities. See Chapter 5 of
Keeney and Raiffa [6] for details.] Now we need to look
for the next-most important change after fatalities. To
be quick--based on your previous answers--let's start
with radioactive waste, chronic health effects, and elec-
tricity generated, all at their worst levels. Which of
these would you rather move up to its best?
[This impliesChronic health effects, I'd have to say.
that k,O is greater than k S or k".]
K: How about chronic effects relative to nuclear safeguards?
B:
B: That's very close, but I think chronic effects.
K: Just glance over the other attributes now: energy needed,
x7 ' for example.
B: That one doesn't bother me so much.
R: So chronic health effects would be No.2.
Yes.B:
K:
B:
K:
B:
K:
B:
K:
B:
K:
B:
K:
B:
K:
B:
K:
B:
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[This implies that k is second-largest next to k 1].10
What would be No.3?
It's difficult for me to grasp all the implications of
energy generated. If electrical energy production is
really 0.5 trillion kilowatts, it will be pretty tough.
So would you like to go back and give up those 600 people?
No, no, I wouldn't, but electricity generated is important.
And chronic health effects is still No.2?
Yes, but I think electricity generated comes in here now;
then I think the nuclear safeguards.
You mean the change in tons of plutonium produced from
50 to 0 is more important than the change in waste from
200 to 0 metric tons.
Yes, sure.
Okay, and now assume that all the attributes X2 through Xa
are fixed at their worst levels.
I would first pick 802 .
It's more important than the waste problem?
Yes, that's my bias; I'm not too worried about radioactive
waste. I do worry about nuclear safeguards, but I don't
think waste is that big a problem. However, I would put
radioactive waste next.
Okay, now you have attributes x2 ,x3 ,x4 ,X6 , and X7 left.
[We are continually using Table 1 in the discussion.]
Next is permanently unusable land. Of the alternatives,
I'd prefer to move it from 2000 to 0 acres.
Okay, now there is x3 'x4 'x6 ' and X7 .
Energy needed doesn't bother me. That one is going to be
last. I think temporarily unusable land, then water, then
particulates, and then thermal energy needed. So it goes
x3 ,x 4 ,x6 ,X7 ·
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K: Good, let's check the order then. We started out with all
attributes in their worst case. And you preferred moving
fatalities from 700 to 100 to eliminating the chronic
effects due to 2000 tons of lead pollution.
B: Yes, that's right.
K: You preferred avoiding 2000 tons of lead pollution to
raising electricity generated from 0.5 to 3.0 trillion
kilowatt hours.
B: Yes.
K: And that electricity increase you preferred to reducing
the plutonium produced from 50 to 0 tons. [We continued
in this manner and found no changes in the order. Thus,
we have k 1 > k 10 > k 11 > kg > k 5 > kS > k 2 > k 3 > k 4 > k 6
> k 7 ·]
K: Many of your above responses could have been inferred from
earlier choices when we were checking for preferential
independence. For example, look at the tradeoffs between
temporarily unusable land and water evaporated in Figure 5
(see page 15).
B: Okay.
K: There you said you preferred consequence B to consequence C.
Thus if you began at point K in that figure and had to go
to either B or C, you would prefer to go to B. This says
that you would rather move from 200,000 to 10,000 acres
used than move from 1.5 to 0.5 trillion gallons of water
evaporated, which is exactly what you said in evaluating
k 3 versus k 4 . [Other information given in checking for
preferential independence conditions was also consistent
with the ordering of the k. 's.]
1
4.4 Assessing the Scaling Constants: Tradeoffs Among
Attributes
K: Now that we have the order of the k. IS, let's assess the
1
tradeoffs to get their relative values. Let's start with
X1 and X10 . Refer to Figure 13. You said previously that
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you prefer consequence B to consequence A. Thus, if you
were at A, 700 fatalities and 0 tons of lead, you would
be willing to increase lead to 2000 tons in order to de-
crease fatalities to 100. Is that right?
B: Yes.
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Figure 13. Fatalities versus chronic health effects.
What if you only got to move to 400 fatalities? That is,
would you be willing to move from A to D?
B: I would still rather save the 300 people [i.e., the 700
-400].
K: What if you can only go to E--500 fatalities--and you
are saving 200?
B: I'd say that's pretty close to what I feel is equivalent
to the chronic effects, so at that point I might switch.
K: You would switch or be indifferent?
B: Be indifferent.
K: Let's look at what this says. Because of the preferential
independence conditions, we can assume that all other
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attributes are at their worst level--so u. = 0 for i ｾ "
1
'O--and equate the utilities of points A and E since you
are indifferent between them. Using either the additive
or multiplicative utility function, we find that the utility
of A is k,O and the utility of E is k,u, (500).
B: Okay.
K: Hence the relationship between k, and k,O is k,O = k,u, (500),
where the utility function u, is measured on a zero-to-one
scale. Based on what you told me in checking for utility
independence, your utility function for fatalities is
essentially linear. Since u, ('00) = , and u, (700) = 0,
u, (500) must be about 0.333. Thus we would have k,O =
0.333k,. We'll refine this later, but for now let's go
on.
Look at the tradeoffs between x" and X, in Figure '4. We
want to find a point on the X, axis, with X" = 0.5, that
is indifferent to point A. The question is, how many
fatalities must you save in order to accept the decrease
in electricity from 3.0 to 0.5 trillion kilowatt hours?
That's tough I know, but I'll ask it anyway.
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Figure '4. Fatalities versus electricity generated.
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B: That is tough. It is certainly less than the ｾ ｡ ｳ ｴ
question, less than the 200 [i.e., the point x 1 = 500].
K: That follows in order to have k 10 > k 11 .
B: All right; well, I'm still confident of that. About 100
at the most.
K: Let's try 50. Suppose you had 650 deaths and 0.5 trillion
kilowatt-hours, or 700 deaths and 3.0. Which would you
prefer?
B: I might take the 700 and 3.
K: And what if it's 550 and 0.5 or 700 and 3?
B: Okay, I'd take the 550.
K: And where would you be indifferent; how about at 600?
B: That's about it. I'd say that's pretty close.
K: What this implies is that k 11 = k 1u 1 (600) or k 1 (.167),
because that's ...
B: One-sixth.
K: Now we can run checks on this. Refer to Figure 15 and
presume you are at point A, 2000 tons of lead and 0.5
trillion kilowatts. Would you rather eliminate the lead
(point B) or increase electricity production to 3.0 (point
C)?
B: Lose the lead.
K: That's consistent with your previous responses, since with
other attributes at their worst levels, both the additive
and multiplicative utility functions imply that the utility
of B is k 10 and the utility of C is k 11 . And you have
said k 10 is greater than k 11 .
Now back up X10 . Suppose you could only go to 1500 lead
(point D) or 3.0 million kilowatt hours (point C). Which
do you prefer? Another way to think of this is, you're
at point D with 0.5 electricity and 1500 lead, and you are
told you can increase electricity to 3.0 if you are willing
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to accept 500 more tons of lead. Would you do it?
B: Yes, I guess I would.
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K: How about if you started at 500 tons of lead (point E)i
would you accept the additional 1500 to jump up to 3?
B: No.
K: If you started from 750 tons (point F)?
B: No.
K: How about at 1250 (point G)?
B: Okay. That's pretty close. That sounds about where I'd
be indifferent.
K: How about if you are at 1000 (point H) and someone says,
"For an additional 1000 tons of lead, I can move you to
3". Would you accept that or not?
B: No, I don't think so.
K: You had to tell me that because, if you are indifferent
to accepting 750 more tons (i.e., x 10 = 1250), you'd better
not accept 1000 more. What this says is ...
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B: ... that I'm probably confused. This probably isn't con-
sistent.
K: Since C and G are indifferent, we set their utilities
equal and find k 11 = k 10u 10 (1250). I don't know what
u 10 (1250) is, but we can do a quick assessment of u 10 .
Refer to Figure 16. We've got a range of X10 from the worst
point, 2000 tons to the best point, 0 tons. Because of our
scaling convention, we set u 10 (2000) = 0 and u 10 (0) = 1.
Now consider the fifty-fifty lottery of 0 or 2000 tons shown
in Figure 17, and suppose you have this option or x 10 = 500
for sure. Which would you take?
1250 1000 0
Xn (TONS OF LEAD)
CHRONIC EFFECTS
O..-----t----L..l------+-
2000
0.5
52 0.42
ｾ
to
Figure 16. Utility function for chronic health effects.
)( 10= 2000
l( 10 =0
Figure 17. Finding the point of indifference
to a lottery.
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B: 500.
K: The lottery or 1500?
B: I'd take the lottery.
K: How about at 1200?
B: I'd still probably take the lottery.
K: Then we go to 800?
B: I'd take the 800 for sure.
K: 1000?
B: I'd take the 1000, I think.
K: The average in the lottery is 1000, as you know. So, 1100?
B: That's pretty close--you can probably say 1100 is in-
different. I'd take 1050.
K: You'd take 1050 over the lottery?
B: Yes. I'd take 1050 over the lottery.
K: And not 1100?
B: 1100, I don't know; that's pretty close.
K: How about 1200?
B: At 1200, I'd take the lottery.
K: Okay. I'll take 1100 as indifferent.
B: All right.
K: This says that the utility assigned to 1100 must equal to
the utility of the lottery. It's assigned that way so we
can use expected utilities in evaluating alternatives. Hence
we assign u 10 (1100) = 0.5 and plot it on Figure 16.
Would you prefer the fifty-fifty lottery yielding 0 or
1100 tons of lead or an option of the average 550 tons for
sure?
B: I'd take the 550.
K: And which would you choose between the fifty-fifty lottery
yielding 1100 or 2000, and 1550 for sure?
-39-
B: Again, I'd take the sure consequence, the 1550.
K: These last answers imply that you are risk averse in the
attribute chronic health effects, so, as a first approxi-
mation, we can sketch in the concave utility function u 10
in Figure 16. [Later a constantly risk averse function
ｾ ｬ ｩ ｬ ｬ be fit. This degree of precision on the single-
attribute utility functions in a multiattribute problem is
probably sufficient in most cases. Subtle differences in
risk attitudes on the individual attributes are likely to
have little effect relative to variations in the k. values
1
and the general shape of the u. functions.]
1
Now we can return to the equation k 11 = k 10u 10 (1250).
Eyeballing it from Figure 16, I'd say u 10 (1250) = .42,
implying k 11 = .42 k 10 . with this, we have assessed three
equations relating k 1 ,k10 , and k 11 : namely k 10 = .333 k 1 ,
k 11 = .167 k 1 , and k 11 = .42 k 10 . They are reasonably
consistent, but a slight alteration is required. If just
one of them is changed, we find that the parameter in the
first one must be .4, so k 10 = .4 k 1 , or that the second
becomes k 11 = .14 k 1 , or that the third becomes k 11 = .5k10 .
Let's see how much your answers leading to the original
three equations would have to change in order to get the
new consistent equations.
Assuming linear preferences for fatalities, u 1 (460) = .4,
so you would have to be indifferent to points A and F in
Figure 13 to adjust the first equation. Alternatively, in
Figure 14, since u 1 (616) = .14, the indifference point should
be at 616 fatalities instead of 600 to change the second
equation. To adjust the third equation, you could either
be indifferent between (x 10 = 1100, x 11 = 0.5) and
(x10 = 2000, x 11 = 3) in Figure 15 or adjust from 1100 to
1250 the value of X10 for which you are indifferent to
the lottery in Figure 17. Of course, there are options of
adjusting each of these by a small amount. However, it is
easier just to move one to be consistent.
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B: Yes; the one I
in Figure 14.
fatalities, is
feel the least strongly about is the one
You said you could move the 600 to 616
that right?
K: Right.
B: I think I would notice the 40 additional fatalities in
Figure 13; 1100 seems low on the tradeoff in Figure 15,
and 1250 seems high as an indifference amount for the
lottery. Yes, I think I'd be happy to change the 600 to 616
in Figure 14.
K: Fine, then for now we are consistent in our tradeoffs among
attributes X1 ,X10 , and X11 . What we should do now is go
through the same procedure for each of the other eight
attributes. We can look at the tradeoffs relative to deaths,
attribute X1 , or to attribute X10 or X11 • Let's choose
something other than deaths just to indicate how to do that.
Since we already have a rough utility function u 10 , consider
attribute X10 , tons of lead, versus attribute Xg , nuclear
safeguards. Note that Xg was the attribute whose scaling
factor was the fourth-largest. In Figure 18, the worst
point G of the possible X9 'X10 combinations is (x g = 50,
x 10 = 2000). If you were at that point, would you rather
move to point A or point B, saving respectively 50 tons of
plutonium produced or 2000 tons of lead produced?
o B
ASSESSED IN DIFFERENCE PAIR
C
F
E
-o
\f)<I:
t- UJu-J
ｾ ｾ 1000
LL. \f) 1200UJz
ｾ f2 1500
z-
o ｾｾ x 1888 ......_O__--+-__ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｔ ｉ ｉ ｾ Ｍ Ｍ
u SOG 25 0
Xs (TONS OF PLUTON IUM PRODUCED)
NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS
Figure 18. Nuclear safeguards versus
chronic health effects.
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B: I'd prefer to save the 2000 tons of lead.
K: That you have already answered a couple of times before.
I just asked it again for a check.
B: Each time it helps me to organize my thoughts.
K: This means that the utility of point B is greater than the
utility of point A, and we know the ｵ ｴ Ｎ ｾ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ of point B is
k 10 and that of point A is kg. What we want to do now is
come down the X10 scale toward 2000 and find a point that
is indifferent to point A. Then we equate the utilities
and we have one equation relating the scaling constants kg
and k 10 . So, if you are o£fered point C, 50 tons of pluto-
nium produced and 1000 tons of lead, or point A, which
would you prefer?
B: That's very difficult. There are so many things to think
about.
[Since the question seemed difficult, I changed to one that
I thought would be easier to answer.]
K: Well then, let's consider point D, 1900 tons of lead and
50 tons of plutonium, versus point A. Which would you
prefer?
B: Oh, then I'd certainly prefer point A.
K: Would you prefer point E or point A?
B: Let me take an easier one now that I've got my thinking
straightened out. Returning to point C versus point A,
I would rather have point c.
K: Okay. How about if X10 is 1200, point F, versus point A?
B: Here I'd still take point F. Thinking about it, I guess
at X10 equal to about 1500 I'd be indifferent.
K: That is, at point E you'd be indifferent.
B: Yes.
K: That's fine for now. This implies that kg, the utility of
A, equals k 10u 10 (1500), the utility of E. From Figure 16,
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it appears as if the utility u10 (1S00) is approximately
0.3, so kg = 0.3 k 10 .
[We continued in this fashion successively evaluating trade-
offs between two attributes at a time. The next pairs
were {XS ,X10 } and {Xa ,X 10 J. Then because k 10 was clearly
much larger than the scaling constants k 2 ,k3 ,k4 ,k6 , and
k 7 of the remaining five attributes, we chose Xa for the
basis of comparison with them. That is, we considered
tradeoffs between {Xa ,X2 }, {Xa ,X3 }, etc. As a final result,
we had ten equations with eleven unknowns: k 1 ,k2 , •.. ,k11 .
These are displayed in Table 2.
[Next we wanted to check whether u was additive or multi-
plicative. Two separate methods were used for this.]
Table 2.
k 10 = k 1u 1 (SOO) x 1 in deaths,
k 11 = k 1u 1 (616) - It -
kg = k 10u 10 (1S00) x 10 in tons,
k S = k 10u 10 (1600) "
k
a =
k 10u 10 (1700) "
k 2 = kaua(SO) x a in metric tons,
k 3 = k a u a (7S) "
k 4 = k a u a (100) "
k 6 = k a u a (1S0) "
k 7 = k a u a (1aO) "
K: ｎ ｯ ｾ our ten equations specify the relative values of the
k. IS. To get their absolute values, I need to ask you one
1
very tough question. It is not necessary to ask such a
difficult question; however, it does simplify the calcu-
lations that are needed to determine the k. IS. It is also
1
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illustrative of another method to determine scaling con-
stants, so let's try.
Consider the two options in Figure 19. Option A is a con-
sequence with fatalities at its best level, that is 100
fatalities, and all other attributes at their worst level
as shown in Table 1. Option B is a lottery which gives you
all eleven attributes at their best levels with probability
p or otherwise all attributes at their worst levels with
probability 1 - p. The question is, what is p such that you
are indifferent between options A and B? Let's tryout some
numbers. Suppose p is 0.8 and 1 - P is 0.2, which would you
prefer?
Option A
Fatalities at best level,
100 deaths.
All other attributes at
worst levels (see Table 1)
Option B
All attributes
ｾ at best levels
ｾ All attributes
1-p at worst levels
For the assessed probability p = 0.6, Options A and B were
indifferent.
Figure 19. Assessing the indiffeience probability:
at p = 0.6.
B: With P = 0.8, I'd have to go with the lottery, I think.
K: One way to look at this is as follows. Suppose you have
the consequence in option A and decide to switch it for
the lottery with p = 0.8. Then if you are unlucky and move
to the worst case, the difference from option A is 600
additional deaths, and this occurs with probability 0.2. If
you are lucky, of which there is a 0.8 chance, you maintain
the lowest level of 100 fatalities and improve on all other
ten attributes. Does that seem reasonable?
B: Yes.
K: How about your preference between options A and B when
p = O. 7?
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B: I think I'd still take the lottery at 0.7.
K: How about p = 0.2?
B: I'd take option A in that case.
K: And if p = O.4?
B: I'd take option A.
K: How about 0.6?
B: At 0.6, that's pretty
still take option A.
difference point.
close, I think. At p = 0.5, I'd
Yes, I think 0.6 is about the in-
K: What this implies is that the utility of option A must
equal the utility of option B when p = 0.6. The utility of
A is simply k 1 using either the additive or multiplicative
utility function, and the utility of B is p times 1, the
utility of all attributes at their best levels, plus 1 - P
times 0, the utility of all attributes at their worst levels.
Hence k 1 = P = 0.6. Now we can combine this equation with
the previous ten to calculate values for all eleven k. 'so
1
[This was done roughly and quickly by hand in a couple of
minutes. The sum of the kits, that is k 1 + k 2 + ..• + k 11
equaled 1.14. As indicated by equations (1) and (2), if
\ k. = 1, the utility function is additive, and if L k. ｾ 1,L 1 1
it is multiplicative. Because the sum of the k. 's is quite
1
near to 1.0, an additive utility function may be appropriate.
We will now try to find out whether this is so.]
Now let's try to get a qualitative feeling for your pref-
erences in situations involving more than one attribute
being varied. Consider the two options in Figure 20.
Option I gives you a one-half chance at 100 deaths with 0
lead, and a one-half chance at 700 deaths with 2000 tons
of lead. Option II is similar, but it gives you one-half
chances at either 100 deaths with 2000 tons of lead or 700
deaths with 0 lead. You can consider all attributes other
than fatalities X1 and lead X10 to be fixed at any levels,
but the same fixed levels for each option. Which option,
I or II, do you prefer?
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Option I Option II
1/2 (x1 = 100, x 10 = 0) 1/2 (x 1 = 100, x 10 = 2000)ｾ ｾ2000) 700, x 10 0)( x1 = 700, x 10 = (x1 = =
Options I and II were found to be indifferent.
(X1 measured in deaths and x10 in tons of lead.)
Figure 20. Preferences for combinations of fatalities
and tons of lead.
Before answering, let me point out that with both options,
you have an identical chance at 100 or 700 deaths and an
identical chance at 0 or 2000 tons of lead. So considering
one attribute at a time, the consequences are the same. How-
ever, with Option I you get either the best or worst of
both attributes, whereas with Option II you will get the
best of one but the worst of the other attribute. Do you
have a preference or are you indifferent?
B: I think I am indifferent. Yes, I think I am indifferent.
K: Let me suggest very rough arguments for preferring one or
the other. You may say that with either consequence in II,
the situation will be "very bad," whereas at least with
Option I, there is a one-half chance to come out okay.
This implies that I is preferred to II. Alternatively, you
may say I can handle either case resulting from II, but
the second possibility in Option I is simply untenable;
therefore I'd prefer II. Or these two effects may balance
each other and you would be indifferent.
B: I understand the two positions and I like the idea of
having a shot at both at their best, but it is very close
to indifferent.
be greater
k. should be
1
K:
B:
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What this implies is that the k. 's should sum to 1.0.
1
If you had preferred II to I, the L k. should
1
than 1.0, and if you preferred I to II, the L
less than 1.0.
That's interesting, because if I had selected one, I would
have taken II.
[I now repeated the same test for additivity with a pair
of attributes that I felt might indicate non-additivity.
In assessing utility functions, the assessor should play
the devil's advocate.]
K: Consider one more similar question involving the attributes
x5 ' 802 pollution, and X6 ' particulate pollution. In
Figure 21, with Option III, you get either 5 million tons
of 802 pollution with 0.2 million tons of particulate or
80 million tons of 802 with 10 million particulate. And
I think Option IV is clear. Which do you prefer, or are
you indifferent? Here again the implications are identical
taking one attribute at a time. The difference is in how
the attribute levels are combined.
Option III Option IV
ｾ Ｕ ］ Ｕ Ｎ x == 0.2) 1/2 (x5 == 5, x 6 == 10)6 ｾ1/2 (X = 80, x = 10) = 80, x 6 = 0.2)5 6 5
Options III and IV were found to be indifferent.
(x5measured in 10 6 tons of 802 and x 6 in 10
6 tons of particulate.)
Figure 21. Preferences for combinations of 802 and
particulate pollution.
B: Again I'm reasonably close to indifferent. Although there
is perhaps a little synergistic effect with these two
attributes, I would still be very close to indifferent.
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K: Then we will assume that your utility function is additive,
implying again that the ki's sum to 1.0. This relationship
together with the ten equations relating the relative
values of the k. 's implies (after a little calculation)
l.
that k 1 = 0.526. Let's return to Figure 19 and examine
this implication. It means that you should be- indifferent
between Option A and Option B when p = 0.526. Does this
seem reasonable?
B: Yes, it does. I don't think that distorts my feelings.
4.5 Assessing the Single-Attribute Utility Functions
K: Good, then the only assessments that remain are the in-
,..
dividual utility functions, the u i . Actually we have
already assessed u 1 and u 10' so let's try u 2 . '.-
Refer to Figure 22 where we have scaled x2' the permanent
land use, from 2000 acres, the worst point, to a acres,
the best. Thus we assign u 2 (2000) = a and u 2 (0) = 1 as
illustrated in the ｦ ｩ ｧ ｵ ｾ ･ Ｎ Now considerra choice between
a fifty-fifty lottery yielding ･ ｩ ｴ ｾ ･ ｲ x 2 =2000 or x 2 = 0,
and an option giving you 806 acres used for sure. Which
would you prefer?
B: 800.
K: How about 1400 versus the lottery?
B: The lottery.
K: And 900 versus the lottery?
B: At 900, I would take it.
K: A thousand?
B: That's going to be the point of indifference.
K: So then the utility function is probably very close to
linear as shown in Figure 22.
B: In this case I think so.
K: Good. Then let's go on to u 3 . Temporary land use goes
200,000 to 10,000 acres. If you had a ｾｾｦｴｹＭｦｩｦｴｹ lottery
-qa-
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Figure 22. First-cut utility functions.
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yielding either of these or 80,000 for sure, which would
you take?
B: The 80,000.
K: How about 130(000 acres versus the lottery?
B: I'd take the lottery.
K: How about 110,000 acres?
B: I'd stick with the lottery. Again I think in this case
I would be indifferent at the mean for such lotteries.
K: Then u 3 is also linear.
[We assessed utility functions for the other attributes in
a similar fashion. The results are shown in Figure 22.
For public problems, it seems to be especially true that
several utility functions are linear in their respective
attributes. This is largely a result of the range of
possible consequences. Let me illustrate this with an
excerpt from the assessment of the utility function for
radioactive waste.]
K: Let us now assess u g • You can probably figure out what
the question will be.
B: Yes. This one I've thought about; it's going to be linear.
The maximum is only 200 metric tons. Now if that were
2000 metric tons, my answer would be much different. My
indifference point to a fifty-fifty lottery of 0 or 2000
metric tons would be quite a bit over the mean.
K: [We also will illustrate part of the assessment of the
utility for electricity generated.]
Electricity generated goes from 0.5 to 3.0 trillion kilo-
watt hours. Because this is a proxy variable, you've
got to think about what you would do with the various
energy amounts if you had them. Consider a fifty-fifty
lottery of 0.5 or 3.0 versus 2.0 for sure.
B: If I could have 2.0 for sure, I'd take it.
K: How about 1.75?
B: Let's see, the mean of this lottery is 1.75. I'd take 1.75
- Sf)-
for sure rather than the lottery.
K: How about 1.0 versus the lottery?
B: Now 1.0 is about the current level of electricity. I'd
come close to taking 1.0, but I guess I would take the
lottery.
K: How about 1.5?
B: I'd take the 1 .5.
K: And 1. 25?
B: That's about it, I think. That's where I'm indifferent.
K: That seems reasonable to me, too. This completes a first-
cut assessment of the ui's, and we now have all the infor-
mation needed to specify your utility function. We have
found out that for you,
11
L
i=1
k.u. (x.)
ｾ 1. 1.
,
where the k. 's are found by solving the equations in Table 2
ｾ
plus L k. = 1, and the u. 's are shown in Figure 22.
ｾ ｾ
Let us examine an implication of your utility function. In
particular, refer to Figure 23 where we have pictured the
{X 1 'xa} consequence space. Now since k 1 > k a, there must
be some consequence, call it C, between points A and B which
is indifferent to point D. If, for C, the level of X1 is
designated by x 1, then equating the utilities of C and D,
we find k 1u 1 (x1) = ka. Given the values of k 1 and kS which
we have calculated, this implies u 1 (x1) = .0667. From
Figure 22, it follows that x1 = 660. Put together, this
implies that you should be indifferent between C: (x1 = 660,
x a = 200) and D: (x 1 = 700, x a = 0). Does this seem reason-
able or out of the question or a little high or ••. ?
B: It seems quite reasonable.
5. The Second Assessment of Buehring's Utility Function
I didn't do all the curve fitting and calculations neces-
sary to specify the overall utility function given the
assessed information. The reason was that we planned to
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lfigure 23. Implied tradeoff between radioactive
waste and fatalities.
K:
reassess aspects of Dr. Buehring's utility function in a
few days after enough time for reflection. In the mean-
time, Buehring assessed Wes Foell's utility function over
the same attributes. Dr. Foell is the head of a project on
Integrated Energy Systems at IIASA, and as mentioned, is
also the leader of the Wisconsin research team that developed
the Wisconsin model. This interaction allowed Bill Buehring
to "get some feedback on his preferences." For instance,
if Foell's preferences were radically different from -
Buehring's, then Buehring could ask for the reasons and
incorporate the answer (i.e., the new information) modifying
his own preference structure. What follows is our secoDd-
cut assessment of Dr. Buehring's utility function. Because
of the work behind us, it is obviously much more streamlined.
Could you give me the ordering of the k. IS, that is, the
1
order in which you would like to move attributes from their
worst to best levels in Table 1? If we run into inconsis-
tencies later, we can simply revise the list.
B: All right: 10, 1,9,5,8,11,3,2,4,7,6. I think
that's it.
K: This means you would prefer going from 2000 to 0 tons of
lead rather than 700 to 100 fatalities?
-52-
B: Yes.
K: And you'd prefer going from 700 to 100 fatalities to going
from 50 to 0 tons of plutonium produced?
B: Yes.
[We continued down the list this way as a simple check and
found no changes necessary. This implies
K: In Table 3 we have the attribute list with the old and new
ranking of the k. scaling constants. If we compare these
.J.
lists, nothing moved more than one position except k 11 ,
which moved three positions. Why do you feel this happened?
Table 3. Ranking of the scaling constants.
Attribute Ranking
Old New
k 1 1 2
k 10 2 1
k 11 3 6
kg 4 3
k S 5 4
k a 6 5·
k 2 7 a
k 3 a 7
k 4 9 9
k 6 10 11
k 7 11 10
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B: I think that I overvalued the increase of energy from 1.5
to 3.0 trillion kilowatt hours in my previous answers.
The shape of the utility function over the last part of
the curve for energy generated will Qevery close to flat.
It is only slightly better to have 3.0 than 1.5 trillion
kilowatt hours.
K: There are three places where there are simple position
interchanges among the k i ' s. The first is between k 10 and
k 1 • How did this come about?
B: I've always felt that the trace elements are very important.
After interviewing Wes, I decided that the health impact
of 2000 tons of lead could be much larger than 600 quanti-
fied fatalities. Furthermore there are the E;!sthetic im-
pacts due to the lead pollution. The more I thought about
it, the worse it became.
K: Another reversal had to do with permanent land use and
temporary land use.
B: I think before I was concentrating on the permanency question
and ranked k 2 > k 3 • After thinking more about the magnitudes
of land involved, k) > k 2 •
K: And finally, you reversed particulate pollution and energy
needed. Now k 7 > k 6 •
B: After more thinking about the implications of the worst
level of particulate pollution, I decided it wasn't so bad.
It isn't black soot coming out of the stack.
K: Okay, let's go ahead and get your relative k i values.
Consider Figure 24. You have said point A is preferred to
point B.
B: Yes.
K: How about point C versus B? Would you prefer 'c (x1 = 700,
x 10 = 1 000) or B (x 1 = 100, x 1a = 2aa0) ?
B: I'd take B.
K: Point D versus B?
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Figure 24. Reassessed tradeoff between fatalities
and chronic health effects (cf. Figure 13).
B: Here I'd be indifferent. Yes, that's about it.
K: Okay, this means k 1 = k10u 10 (500) since the utility of
points Band D must be equal.
[We continued in this manner as illustrated before and
generated the ten equations in Table 4.]
Let me now ask you a question on additivity. Maybe since
you assessed Wes' utility function you've already thought
more about it.
B: Yes, I have and I am additive.
K: Well, let's try one check. Refer to Figure 25 where there
are two lotteries involving Xl and X10 , the two attributes
whose ranges are most heavily weighted. Do you have a
preference between them?
B: No, I am indifferent.
[This implies again that 2
equations in Table 4 gives
unknowns: k 1 ,k2 , ... ,k1l •
k l = 1, which together with the
us eleven equations with eleven
Later on we will solve for these.]
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Table 4 .
k 1 = k 10u 10 (500) x 10 in tons,
kg = k 10u 10 (1200) x 10 in tons,
k 5 = k 10u 10 (1700) x 10 in t'ons,
ka = k Su S (10) Xs iIi million tons,
k 11 = k Su S (20) Xs in million tons,
k 3 = k 5u S (60) Xs in million tons,
k 2 = k 3u 3 (SO) x 3 in thousands of acres
k 4 = k 3u 3 (7S) x3 in thousands of acres,
k 7 = k 3u 3 (12S) x 3 in thousands of acres,
k 6 = k 3u 3 (1S0) x3 in thousands of acres.
LOTTERY'
(x, =700 ,x'O = 2000)
(x, ='00, xI)- 0 )
LOTTERY 2
(X, :et>O, x'O =2000)
Figure 2S. Reassessment of preferred combinations
of consequence levels (cf. Figure 20):
Buehring remained indifferent to
lotteries 1 and 2.
K: Going on, refer to Figure 26. Option I gives you fatalities
of 100 for sure and Option II gives you a p chance at all
of the attributes at their best or a 1 - P chance of all
at their worst. Which would you choose if p = 0.5?
B: ｾ ｨ ｡ ｴ Ｇ ｳ tough.
Option I
Fatalities at best level,
100 deaths.
All other attributes at
worst levels (see Table 1)
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Option II
All attributes
at best levels
All attributes
at worst levels
Options I and II were assessed to be indifferent for p = 0.35.
This was adjusted to p = 0.3 to be consistent with the response
for Options V and VI below.
Option III Option IV
Chronic effects at best level,
o tons of lead.
All other attributes at worst
levels (see Table 1).
All attributes
at best levels
All attributes
at worst levels
Options III and IV were assessed to be indifferent for q = 0.45.
This was adjusted to q = 0.4 to be consistent with the response
for Options V and VI below.
Option V Option VI
Fatalities at best level,
100 deaths.
Chronic effects at best
level, 0 tons of lead.
All other attributes at
worst levels (see Table 1)
All attributes
at best levels
All attributes
at worst levels
Options V and VI were assessed to be indifferent for r = 0.7.
For consistency with the additive utility function, this in-
difference r must equal the indifference p plus the indiffer-
ence q above.
Figure 26. Assessment of indifference
probabilities.
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K: Well, suppose you have Option I. Would you risk a 0.5
chance at fatalities increasing to 700 for a 0.5 chance
at all other attributes raised to their best level?
B: At 0.5 I'd take the lottery.
K: What if p = 0.4?
B: I'd still take the lottery, but just barely.
K: At P = 0.3?
B: At P = 0.3 ... at p = 0.35 I'd essentially be indifferent.
K: Now consider the same type of question only between Options
III and IV in Figure 26. If q = 0.5 which would you choose?
B: At 0.5 I think I'd take the lottery, but that is close.
K: How about q = 0.3?
B: At 0.3, I'd take Option III.
K: What if q = 0.4?
B: At 0.4, I'm almost indifferent. That's a little low; how
about 0.45?
K: This is interesting and quite consistent with earlier
responses in this session. Which do you prefer between
the two sure Options I and III?
B: Well, III as I've already said.
K: Sure, so if Option I is indifferent to II for some value
p, and III is indifferent to IV for some value q, which
should be bigger, p or q?
B: I guess q since IV must be preferred to II given the respec-
tive indifference options.
K: Yes, and in fact an in-the-head calculation implies that
the ratio of 0.35 to 0.45 is very consistent also. [These
numbers should equal k 1 and k 10 respectively. A later
calculation indicates that the implied ratio is in fact
very consistent.] Now consider Option V with lead and
fatalities both at their best levels and all other attributes
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at their worst levels, or Option VI with probability r = 0.5.
B: At 0.5, I'd take the sure thing, Option V.
K: Suppose r = 0.9.
B: At 0.9, I'd take it.
K: You'd take the lottery?
B: Yes, I'd take it.
K: At r = 0.6?
B: At 0.6, I don't think I'd take the lottery. I'd go back to
Option V. What I'm saying is that the other attributes
don't mean much here, aren't I?
K: What you are implying is that you are not willing to change
from V and take a 0.4 chance at 2000 tons of lead and 600
additional deaths in order to get a 0.6 chance at pushing
all the other attributes up to their best level.
B: Well, I guess I do feel this way. It's not that those
others are meaningless though; this bothers me a little
bit. If this were a consistent answer with the two previous
choices, would the indifference probability r be 0.8?
K: Yes, for consistency with the additive utility function,
r must equal p + p.
B: At 0.8, it seems too high. Maybe the other indifference
probabilities should be a little lower.
K: That is exactly the type of thinking we want to promote
with utility assessments.
B: That is a good check.
K: Let's return to r = 0.6.
B: I'd still take Option V at r = 0.6, but maybe at r = 0.7,
I'd be indifferent. Yes, I can't believe it's as high as
0.8, so there must be something wrong with the other in-
difference probabilities.
K: Okay, then the sum of the first two indifference probabili-
ties must be 0.7. A simple way to do this is make p = 0.3
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and q = 0.4. [I marked these on the respective lotteries
for Options II and IV.] How does this seem?
B: I'll buy that. Yes, at 0.3 and 0.4, they seem very close.
K: We can do a quick sloppy check to see whether these numbers
are at all reasonable. We'll assume that all the utility
functions are linear, an approximation that is probably
okay for present purposes. Referring to Table 4, we see
that kg would be about 8/20 of k 10 or 0.16, since the
decrease from 2000 to 1200 tons of lead is equivalent to
the entire range of nuclear safeguards, 50 tons to zero.
Similarly, k S would be 3/20 or 0.06. Now k a would be
almost the same as k S . Specifically, it would be 14/15
times 0.06, but we'll assume that it is 0.06. And k 11
would be 12/15 of k a, or about 0.05. Anyway, summed up,
we see that the eleven kits would equal approximately 1.1.
For additivity, as you know, they should sum to 1.0.
However, given the roughness of our calculations, the
numbers seem to check out reasonably well.
B: That's not bad; it's amazing.
K: The last assessments we'll do here will be to get the single-
attribute utility functions. I only need one certainty
equivalent on each of these. Let's take the lead first and
consider a fifty-fifty lottery yielding either 0 or 2000
tons. For what sure level are you indifferent to this
lottery?
B: It's a little over 1000, 1100 maybe.
K: Okay. The next assessment is for x1 .
B: That's going to be linear, that's fatalities.
K: In our last session, you felt it was very close to linear.
Now do you think It 1S llnear, or do you nave the same
feeling as before?
B: Fatalities? I think it 1S linear, perfectly linear.
K: The third one IS x9 ' nuclear safeguards. Cons1der a
fifty-fifty lottery yielding 0 or 50 tons of plutonium
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produced or 25 tons for sure. Which would you choose?
B: I'd take the sure 25.
K: How about 40 for sure versus the lottery?
B: At 40, I'd take the lottery.
K: 35?
B: I think that's about it.
[This procedure was continued for all the other attri-
butes. The results are shown in Figure 27. The three
points marked by dots in the figure were those used in
the assessment. The middle one was the certainty equiva-
lent for a fifty-fifty lottery of the outer two.]
K: We can compare these responses to those you gave before if
you are interested.
B: I am, actually.
K: Okay, let's look at Figures 22 and 27. On attribute x 10 '
before you gave 1100 and this time 1100 for the certainty
equivalent of a fifty-fifty lottery yielding 0 or 2000,
which seems rather consistent. On attribute x 1 ' you were
linear both times. For x9 ' you gave 35 as your certainty
equivalent both times. Actually, the only three that seem
to be much different at all are x 11 'x3 ' and x6 . On x 11 '
you gave 1.0 this time and 1.25 last time. You can reflect
on this and change your mind if you want.
B: I think I should stay with the 1.0, because I feel the
utility of 2.0 trillion kwh is very close to 1. There is
simply not much difference between 2.0 and 3.0 trillion kwh.
K: Suppose it is 0.9, what does that mean to you?
B: It means that over the range 0.5 to 3.0, I'll have received
90 percent of utility possible by reaching 2.0. Said
another way, if I have a fifty-fifty lottery yielding 0.5
or 2.0, or a fifty-fifty lottery yielding 0.5 or 3.0, my
certainty equivalents probably would not be that different.
K: That's right.
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Figure 27. Second-cut utility functions.
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B: And so I want to stick with 1.0 as the certainty equiva-
lent.
K: Good. Let's go on with x3 : you are now indifferent to
the fifty-fifty lottery yielding 10,000 or 200,000 acres
and 130,000 acres for sure, whereas before you were linear.
Do you know anything you were thinking about that seemed
different in the two assessments?
B: I'm thinking now of some sort of cumulative effect. By
the time we get to 200,000 acres, it's getting to be a
very noticeable impact.
K: Finally, now you are linear in attribute X6 ' particulate
pollution, whereas before you were a little off linear.
Any reflection on that?
B: As I think about it, the worst case for particulates is
not very noticeable. Therefore there are no real cumulative
effects in this range.
K: Well, now I guess all the information is here to calculate
the utility function.
6. Calculating the utility Function
From the theorem presented in Section 2 of this report
and our assessments, we know the utility function is
11
u(x 1 ,x2 ,···,x11 ) = Ii=1 k.u.(x.)111 , (3 )
where u and the u. 's are scaled zero to one, the k. 's are posi-
1 1
tive, and L k i = 1. To specify the utility function u, we need
to calculate the u. 's and k. 'so
1 1
First exponential curves were fit to the nonlinear single-
attribute utility functions using the data in Figure 27. The
final results are given in Table 5.
Next, given the utility functions in Table 5, we could solve
the set of ten equations in Table 4 and the equation L k i = 1
for the eleven unknown k. 'so The eleven equations used for the
1
solution are given in Table 6, as well as the solution itself in
Table 5. The single-attribute utility functions.
I
Range
Attribute ui xi' measured in worst Best
X1 = fatalities u 1 (x1 ) = (700 - X1 )/600 deaths I 700 100
X2 = permanent land use I u 2 {x2 ) = (2000 - x 2 )/2000 acres I 2000 0
X3 = temporary land use I u 3 (x3 ) = 1.496 - 0.466eO.OOS81x3 103 acres 200 10
X4 = water evaporated I u4(xq ) = 1.784 - .S20eO.822x4 12 1.5 0.510 gallons I
'"
= S02 pollution I u 5 {xS) = 1.784 - .742eO.011xS 10 6 tons SO 5 wXs I
X6 = particulate pollution I u 6 {x6 ) = (10 - x 6 )/9.8 106 tons I 10 0.2
X7 = thermal energy needed u 7 {x7 ) = 4.260 - 2.495eO.0892x7 10
12 kwh (thermal) 6 3
X8 = radioactive waste uS(xS) = (200-- Xa)/200 metric tons 200 0
X9 = nuclear safeguards I u 9 (x9 ) = 1.198 - 0.19SeO.036x9 I tons of plutonium I SO 0
X10 = chronic effects I u 10 {x10 ) = 3.017 - 2.017e·0002013x10 tons of lead I 2000 0
X11 = electricity generated I u 11 (x 11 ) = 1.039 - 2.003e-1.313x11 1012 kwh (electric) I 0.5 3
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Table 6. Solving for the Scaling Constants. *
k.
1.
Relationship to k 10 k. equals1.
Value
of k.
1.
.339
k 1 k 1 = k 1 OU 1 0 (SOO)
k 9 k 9 = k 1 OU 1 0 (1200)
k S kS=k10u10(1700)
k 8 k 8 = kSuS (10) = k 10u 1()(1700)uS (10)
k11 k 11 =kSu S,(20) =k10u10(1700)uS(20)
k 3 k 3 =kSu S (60) =k10u10(1700)uS(60)
k 2 k 2 =k3u 3 (SO) =k10u10(1700)uS(60)u3(SO)
k 4 k 4 =k3u 3 (75) c:: k10u10(1700)u5(60)u3l75)
k 7 k 7 = k 3u 3 (125) = k 10u 10 (1700)uS (60)u3 (125)
k 6 k 6 =k3u 3 (150) =k10u10(1700)u5(60)u3(1S,0)
o. 786k10
0.177k10
0.169k10
0.1S2k10
0.063k10
0.OS4k10
O. 048k10
0.033k10
0.023k10
.226
.1S2
.060
.057
.051
.021
.018
.016
.011
.008
*Solving r k i = 2.9S3k10 = 1 yields k lO
the other k. 's are evaluated.
1.
I=2.953k10 I=1.0
0.33'9 from which
the final column.
The final utility function is given by equation (3) above
plus Tables Sand 6.
-; . Discussion
Let me briefly comment on two topics: the assessment pro-
cedure itself and the uses for the resulting utility function.
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First, for ｣ ｯ ｮ ｶ ｾ ｮ ｩ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ in calculation, some of the questions
asked of Dr. Buehring in specifying his utility function were
difficult to consider. These are not necessary, especially if
one has some computer support. For instance, one never needs
to ask for indifference probabilities directly as we did with
the options in Figure 26. In this case, we did not actually
use them in specifying the utility function.
A second point is that, had there been a preference between
the lotteries in Figure 25, the overall utility function u would
have been multiplicative. As is seen from equation (2), this
would mean that an additional scaling constant, the k in (2),
would need to be specified. It is evaluated directly from the
values of the eleven ki's. The point is that the multiplicative
utility function is only slightly more difficult than the addi-
tive to specify and use. See Keeney and Raiffa [6] for several
applications.
The utility function u should be carefully scrutinized to
make sure it does capture Mr. Buehring's preferences. For
instance, it would now be easy to draw sets of indifference
curves given u. By examining these, one may find aspects of the
utility function which are not appropriate. When this is the
case, the "errors" should be corrected.
As an example, the values of k 1 and k 10 in Table 6 imply
that p and q in Figure 25 should be .266 and .339 rather than
.3 and .4 respectively, if the tradeoffs among the other nine
attributes and X1 and X10 remain the same and if the additive
utility function is to be used. Alternatively, if the assessed
values .3 and .4 seem more reasonable and if the above-mentioned
tradeoffs remain fixed, a multiplicative utility function must be
employed. Such discrepancies ｮ ｾ ･ ､ to be reconciled before using
the utility function to evaluate policy.
The uses of the utility function might be categorized as
either formal evaluation or informal structuring. The first is
rather clear. One combines thIS preference model witr the out-
put of an impact model (probabilistic or deterministlc) and
simply calculates the expected utility of alternatives.*
*See Buehring [1] for an evaluation of six pOllCy options
using such a utility function.
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Of course, a sophisticated analysis should include sensitivity
analyses, etc., but at least in theory, this is relatively
straightforward. In this way, the utility function directly
addresses the first two complexities (uncertainties and multiple
objectives) raised at the beginning of the paper.
What I mean by "informal structuring" includes thinking
about one attribute at a time, deciding whether the measure is
good, and seeing where critical information is lacking (e.g.,
relationships between pollution levels and fundamental health
effects.) It also includes helping to focus discussion with
others to sort out where differences and agreements are, to
define attributes precisely, and to indicate weaknesses of the
impact model because it fails to include aspects which clearly
affect preferences. In the context of a team working on a prob-
lem, the intent is to improve the quality of the interaction to
lead to a better overall model in the end.
Used as an aid to focus discussion, utility analysis can be
helpful in addressing the third complexity mentioned at the be-
ginning of this paper. The procedures can lead to a much better
understanding of the points of agreement and the points of dis-
agreement among individuals in a decision making unit. It may
indicate reasons for these disagreements and suggest directions
of research that would tend to minimize them. Once such dif-
ferences are as small as possible, analysis may prove that the
same policy options are preferred using any of the candidate
utility functions of the different individuals; or at least there
may be uniform agreement to eliminate some alternatives from
consideration. Finally, utility analysis may serve as a mecha-
nism for creative and constructive compromise among individual
members of the decision making unit.
The set of assessments discussed here took about eight
hours of Mr. Buehring's time. Consequently, one fairly common
comment about such assessments is, "This all seems fine, but when
is anybody who is a real decision maker going to take all the
time necessary to do this? We need simpler, even though over-
simplifying, procedures to get the sense of the decision maker's
preferences quickly." I agree that this often is a problem.
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On the other hand, I feel that with the ｭ ｡ ｮ ｾ ｹ ･ ｡ ｲ ｳ of effort
and millions of dollars being spent to model such crucial
problems as those concerning energy policy, we should be able
to 'free' a real decision maker (decision makers), who has a
comprehensive knowledge of the problem area, for a week or so--
at least long enough to reasonably structure his or her prefer-
ences. It may be prudent even to have a team of policy makers
and analysts work together in a several-man-months effort to
construct a good preference model. This would then be coupled
with the impact model for evaluating policy. The default, of
course, is that our decision makers are expected to simul-
taneously consider and balance all the multidimensional con-
sequences of the impact model, as well as their implications,
in their heads and then arrive at a responsible decision.
8. Ackno\'lledgment and postscript
I appreciate very much Bill Buehring's comments on this
paper as well as his willingness to have his preferences appear
in print. The dialogue is clearly altered; however, the changes
were very minor--mainly correcting grammar, deleting uh's and
huh's, removing interruptions, and the like. The complete sense
of the discussion is preserved.
Three months after the assessments took place, Bill and I
went over this paper and informally discussed his preferences.
In the interim, he had evaluated selected policies using his
utility function, assessed some other individuals' preferences,
and learned more about some of the consequences of various levels
of the proxy attributes (e. g. , 502 emissions) used in this paper.
This has led to some minor changes in his preferences, as you
might expect. In light of this plus the fact that the assess-
ments were done under some time pressure, it is inappropriate
to interpret the utility function specified by equation (3) with
Tables 5 and 6 as "the final utility function of Bill Buehring."
However, had he been required to make a policy decision three
months ago, the expressed utility function could have been of
considerable help in ･ ｸ ｡ ｭ ｾ ｮ ｬ ｮ ｧ and choosing among the alterna-
tives.
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